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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between ¯rms' productivity improvement and the volume
of exports, and shows that it can be sometimes negative. Speci¯cally, we simultaneously take into
account intermediate retailers (i.e., vertically) and multimarket linkages (i.e., horizontally). We ¯nd
that an improvement of the manufacturing productivity a®ects the bargained wholesale prices in
opposite directions in asymmetric markets, causing retailers to make corresponding changes that
look surprising. This result can explain for the empirical \productivity puzzle" found in Ghemawat
et al. (2010). Related to this issue is the relationship between buyer power (caused by a retail
merger) and pro¯tability. Contrary to the existing literature, in an extended setup, we ¯nd that the
merger between the downstream duopolists does not improve their pro¯ts if their bargaining power
is strong vs. upstream suppliers.
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1 Introduction
A recent paper by Ghemawat et al. (2010) poses an interesting \productivity puzzle": there is \an
apparent lack of any relationship" between productivity growth rates in Catalan manufacturing and
changes in international trade position. This ¯nding seems to be inconsistent with the standard results
in the international trade literature.1 However, they also point out that replacing international trade
with both interregional and international trade seems to take care of this puzzle; that is, there is a
positive correlation between productivity growth rates and changes in interregional and international
trade position.
The present paper is motivated by their empirical ¯nding. We ask the following question: does
productivity improvement always enhance exports? Our theoretical model shows that the answer is
sometimes \no." Speci¯cally, we take into account intermediate retailers and multimarket linkages which
have not been considered in the existing literature dealing with productivity and exports. We ¯nd that
a productivity improvement a®ects the bargained wholesale prices in opposite directions in markets
that are asymmetric, causing retailers to make corresponding changes that look surprising. Our setup is
natural because many ¯nal product makers do not directly sell to consumers but sell through retailers.
For instance, automobile manufacturers contract with car dealers, and consumer-electronics makers
supply to retailers, who then sell to consumers.
The detailed basic model is as follows. Consider two independent downstream markets, one of which
is \domestic" and the other \foreign." To closely follow Ghemawat et al. (2010), the latter market
(foreign market) is assumed to be bigger than the former one (Spanish market). In each market, there
is a monopolistic retailer that sells an identical product, which is produced by a common upstream
manufacturer. Retailers incur no additional costs except the wholesale price which is bargained between
the retailer and the manufacturer. Parallel trading is prohibitively costly. The manufacturer's marginal
production cost is increasing in total output.
We ¯nd a non-monotone relationship between a manufacturer's productivity improvement and its
1 On the relationship between productivity and exports, recent theoretical papers include for instance Melitz (2003)
and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), and for recent empirical studies, please see Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999), Bernard
et al. (2003), and Helpman et al. (2004). Wagner (2007) provides an excellent survey on this topic.
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volume of exports, even though there exists a monotonically positive relationship between the man-
ufacturer's productivity improvement and its volume of total production.2 The key lies in the two
simultaneous bargaining games for the wholesale prices. An e±ciency improvement also raises the man-
ufacturer's outside options, and the outside option of the bigger market (i.e., the pro¯t from the smaller
market) is raised more, which enables it to obtain a higher wholesale price in the bigger market. As
a consequence, the retailer in this market buys less. This result can probably explain for the puzzle
found in Ghemawat et al. (2010), and it highlights the importance of taking into account the vertical
relationship between the manufacturer and retailers, as well as their strategic interactions through which
pro¯t shifting is carried out across multimarkets horizontally.3
We then extend the model to examine (i) the robustness of the results in the basic model and (ii) the
relationship between buyer power and pro¯tability. By incorpotating direct downstream competition,
we ¯rst show that the \productivity puzzle" still holds in the extended setting, then we examine how
the buyer power caused by a downstream merger a®ects the social surplus and the pro¯tability of the
merged ¯rm. We ¯nd that the horizontal merger is unpro¯table if the bargaining power of the merged
¯rm is strong, which is starkly di®erent from that in the literature, for instance, Lommerud et al. (2005)
and Symeonidis (2010), who show that the horizontal merger is unpro¯table if the bargaining power of
the merged ¯rm is weak. We also ¯nd that the merger improves welfare if the bargaining power of the
upstream suppliers is weak.
In the literature, Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Dobson (1994), Zhao (2001) and Marshall and Merlo
(2004) also adopt simultaneous bargaining structures. However, the main concerns of these studies
are bargaining procedures among the labor union and ¯nal-product ¯rms. They do not consider the
relationship between productivity and exports, and there are no intermediate traders in these studies.
Our model setting is closely related to Inderst and Wey (2007), who assume n downstream ¯rms
located in n independent markets. The ¯rms procure inputs from a single supplier with a convex
production function. They show that a larger buyer can get a discount, which is higher the larger his
2 The result holds even when there is more than one manufacturer.
3 Rey and Tirole (2007) and Inderst (2010) include surveys of recent progress on the study of vertical relations.
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share of the supplier's business. Moreover, the supplier is strictly worse o® after the creation of a larger
buyer through a merger.4 However, our concerns are on merger and buyer power. Their interactions
under multimarket linkages generate results that complement Inderst and Wey (2007) in important
ways.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the basic model. Section 3
presents the main results and also extends the basic model. And Section 4 includes concluding remarks.
Detailed calculations are delegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider two independent downstream markets in two countries. In each market, there is a monopolistic
retailer (D in one country and F in the other country) that sells an identical product, which is produced
by a common upstream manufacturer M . In each downstream market, the demand for the product is
linear:
pi = ai ¡Qi;
where ai is a positive constant, pi is the market price, Qi is the output supplied by retailer i (i = D;F ).
To simplify the analysis, we assume that aD = 1 and aF > 1, i.e., the market of retailer F is larger than
that of retailer D. In the basic model we assume the two markets are segmented, and parallel trading
is not allowed. These restrictions will be relaxed later.
The production technology of manufacturer M is denoted by:
C(QD; QF ) = c(QD +QF )2:
where c is a positive constant. Retailers incur no additional costs except for the wholesale price, wi
(i = D;F ), which is bargained between the retailer and the manufacturer. The market structure in this
model is summarized by Figure 1.
[Figure 1 here]
4 In a similar vein, Inderst and Valletti (2009) consider a case in which a large buyer controls several downstream
¯rms in separate markets. This buyer's wholesale price is then strictly smaller than the wholesale price in the case of
symmetric buyers, which is in turn lower than the wholesale price of competing smaller ¯rms. Es}o et al. (2010) consider
a downstream industry where ¯rms compete to buy capacity in an upstream market which allocates capacity e±ciently.
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The wholesale prices wD and wF are determined by Nash bargaining. We have in mind two simul-
taneous bargaining games: the manufacturer negotiates simultaneously but independently with the two
downstream retailers. Bargaining occurs before actual production takes place. Given wj(i; j = D;F ,
j 6= i), the bargaining problem between manufacturer M and retailer i is described by the payo® pairs
BIi ´ f[(wiQi+wjQj)¡C(Qi; Qj); ¼i]jwi ¸ 0g and the disagreement point (wjQj ¡C(0; Qj); 0), where
¼i is the pro¯t of retailer i given by ¼i = (pi ¡ wi)Qi.
The solution to the bargaining problem can be written as:
wi = argmax
wi
¯ log[¼i] + (1¡ ¯) log[(wiQi + wjQj)¡ C(Qi; Qj)¡ (wjQj ¡ C(0; Qj))]; (1)
where ¯ 2 [0; 1] measures the bargaining power of retailer i relative to that of manufacturer M .5
We consider a game sequence as follows. First, the manufacturer and the retailers negotiate the
wholesale prices wi (i = D;F ). Second, given the wholesale prices, each retailer sets its quantity
supplied to consumers. The game is solved by backward induction.6
3 The Basic Results
Given the negotiated wholesale price wi, the maximization problem of retailer i (i = D;F ) is
max
Qi
¼i = (ai ¡Qi ¡ wi)Qi:
The ¯rst-order conditions lead to (Second order conditions are satis¯ed)
Qi =
ai ¡ wi
2
; ¼i =
(ai ¡ wi)2
4
: (2)
5 This bargaining structure is often used in the literature of industrial organization. An important property of the
Nash bargaining solution is that it can be implemented as the outcome of a dynamic non-cooperative alternating-o®ers
bargaining game (Rubinstein, 1982 and Binmore et al., 1986).
6 We do not consider non-linear contracts. As documented in Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003, p.81), in practice, both the
magnitude and the incidence of two-part tari®s may be insigni¯cant. The fee structure employed here is di®erent from
that in Inderst and Wey (2007), where each trading partner uses a lump-sum transfer. This di®erence in fee structures
leads to quite di®erent results.
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Substituting (2) into (1), we can rewrite the negotiated wholesale prices as
wD = argmax
wD
¯ log
·
(1¡ wD)2
4
¸
+(1¡ ¯) log
"
wD(1¡ wD)
2
¡ c
µ
1¡ wD
2
+
aF ¡ wF
2
¶2
+ c
µ
a¡ wF
2
¶2#
; (3)
wF = argmax
wF
¯ log
·
(aF ¡ wF )2
4
¸
+(1¡ ¯) log
"
wF (aF ¡ wF )
2
¡ c
µ
1¡ wD
2
+
aF ¡ wF
2
¶2
+ c
µ
1¡ wD
2
¶2#
: (4)
These lead to the following reaction functions:
wD =
1¡ ¯ + (1 + aF (1 + ¯))c¡ (1 + ¯)cwF
2 + c
; (5)
wF =
(1¡ ¯)aF + (1 + aF + ¯)c¡ (1 + ¯)cwD
2 + c
: (6)
From the above, we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Pricing Strategy): For any c (> 0), the wholesale prices are strategic substitutes, and the
degree of strategic substitutability increases in c.
This Lemma arises because the reaction functions become steeper as the value of c increases (see
Figure 2).
[Figure 2 here]
Lemma 1 says that when wi is low, wj must be high. This stems from the two bargaining games. The
downstream retailers \indirectly" compete with each other through their independent but simultaneous
negotiations with the upstream manufacturer. This strategic substitutability does not depend on the
linearity of the demand functions. In the Appendix, we show that this relationship holds under general
conditions.
We now use this insight to examine how c a®ects wi and Qi (i = D;F ). A higher c implies a higher
and faster-rising marginal cost. Then it becomes increasingly di±cult for the manufacturer to produce
a larger quantity. In turn, competition between the retailers for the manufacturer's product becomes
more ¯erce, shown by the increasing slopes of the reaction curves as c rises in Figure 2.
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Next, the wholesale prices and quantities in equilibrium can be straightforwardly calculated as, for
all i; j = D;F ; i 6= j
wi =
2(1¡ ¯)ai + ((3¡ ¯)ai + (1 + ¯)2aj)c¡ ai¯(2 + ¯)c2
(2¡ c¯)(2 + (2 + ¯)c) ; (7)
Qi =
(1 + ¯)(2ai ¡ ((1 + ¯)aj ¡ ai)c)
2(2¡ c¯)(2 + (2 + ¯)c) : (8)
The di®erence between wD and wF and its partial derivative with respect to c are respectively
wD ¡ wF = (aF ¡ 1)(¯c¡ (1¡ ¯))(2¡ c¯) ;
@(wD ¡ wF )
@c
=
(aF ¡ 1)¯(1 + ¯)
(2¡ c¯)2 ¸ 0: (9)
Note we have assumed aF > 1.
From Lemma 1, when c becomes higher, not only competition is intensi¯ed, but also the procurement
condition of the foreign retailer becomes better than that of the domestic retailer, due to the former's
larger market size. This enables the foreign retailer to supply more ¯nal output than the domestic
retailer. In fact, we have
Lemma 2 When c is su±ciently large, the manufacturer supplies only to the foreign retailer.
In Lemma 2, c a®ects the manufacturer's decision as follows. In the two bargaining games, the
manufacturer's threat-point payo® is higher when negotiating with retailer D than with F , since if the
former (latter) negotiation broke down, the remaining market for the manufacturer is large (small). And
as c increases, the di®erence between the threat-point payo®s becomes larger (see the last terms in (3)
and (4)). The quantities supplied in the two markets (see (8)) show that the foreign retailer wins this
intensi¯ed competition, due to its larger market.
We now look into how the quantity supplied in each market changes with an increase in c. Di®eren-
tiation yields
@(QF +QD)
@c
= ¡ (1 + aF )(1 + ¯)(2 + ¯)
2(2 + (2 + ¯)c)2
< 0; (10)
@QD
@c
= ¡ (1 + ¯)K
2(2¡ c¯)2(2 + (2 + ¯)c)2 < 0; (11)
@QF
@c
=
¯(2 + ¯)[4aF ¡ (1 + ¯ ¡ aF )c]c¡ 4(1 + aF + ¯)
2(2¡ c¯)2(2 + (2 + ¯)c)2 : (12)
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Both the domestic quantity and the world total quantity decrease as c increases,7 which is as ex-
pected. However, foreign sales may decrease or increase. We ¯nd @QF =@c > 0 if and only if c > cF ,
where
cF ´
8>>><>>>:
2[aF¯(2 + ¯)¡ (1 + ¯)
p
(a2F ¡ 1)¯(2 + ¯)]
¯(2 + ¯)(1 + ¯ ¡ aF ) if aF 6= 1 + ¯;
2
¯(2 + ¯)
if aF = 1 + ¯.
(13)
Note that we must also take into account the boundary condition. Using QD in (8), we ¯nd that QD > 0
if and only if
c < ¹c ´ 2
(1 + ¯)aF ¡ 1 :
The relation between cF and ¹c is as follows:
Lemma 3 cF < ¹c if and only if 1 < aF < 1 + ¯.
From the above, we obtain the following proposition (see alsoFigure 3).
Proposition 1 QF is increasing in c if cF < c < ¹c and 1 < aF < 1 + ¯.
[Figure 3 here]
Intuitively, Proposition 1 can be understood as follows. Consider a decrease in c, which increases the
total quantity supplied by the manufacturer QD +QF . However, the composition of it, QD and QF , is
also a®ected (see Figure 4). And how the composition changes depends on the strategic substitutability
of the two wholesale prices determined in the bargaining games. By Lemma 1, an increase in QD (i.e.,
a decrease in wD) has a negative impact on QF . When c is large, the degree of strategic substitutability
is high, and the resulted sales substitution between the two retailers is also large. As a result, a decrease
in c can reduce QF when c is large.
7 In the equation for @QD=@c,
K ´ 4(1 + (1 + ¯)aF )¡ 4¯(2 + ¯)c+ ¯(2 + ¯)(aF (1 + ¯)¡ 1)c2
We can easily show that K is minimized when c = 2=((1 + ¯)aF ¡ 1), and the minimized value is
Kmin =
4(a2F ¡ 1)(1 + ¯)2
(1 + ¯)aF ¡ 1
> 0:
Therefore, for any c, @QD=@c is negative.
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[Figure 4 here]
This proposition can perhaps explain the stylized fact that in some markets, the volume of exports
may fall as a ¯rm's production e±ciency improves (Ghemawat et al., 2010). It highlights the importance
of taking into account the vertical relationship between the manufacturer and retailers and their strategic
interactions through which pro¯t shifting is carried out across multimarkets.
Remark 1 The Choice of Retailers It has been assumed that the manufacturer must negotiate
with both retailers. We can also consider the case in which it chooses to deal with only one or both
retailers. Suppose only one retailer is chosen, then it must be foreign because the foreign market is
larger than the domestic one. In the revised setting, the game becomes a three-stage game. First,
the manufacturer determines the number of trading partners. Second, it negotiates with the retailers
independently and simultaneously. Finally, given the wholesale prices, each retailer determines its retail
price. We can straightforwardly show that for any c < ¹c, the manufacturer always decides to trade with
both retailers simultaneously.
Remark 2 The Necessity of both Retailers The existence of the retailers in two simultaneous
bargaining games is essential to derive our main results. When the manufacturer directly supplies to
consumers instead, the quantity supplied in each market monotonically increases with the e±ciency im-
provement (the decrease in c).8 Intuitively, without the retailers, the monopolist can increase production
at its discretion when its e±ciency is improved. However, under two simultaneous bargaining games, an
e±ciency improvement also raises the manufacturer's outside options. Speci¯cally, the outside option
of the bigger domestic market is raised more, which enables it to obtain a higher wholesale price, as
shown in (9) and Lemma 2. As a consequence, the retailer in this (foreign) market buys less.
Remark 3 Parallel Trade One might wonder what would happen if parallel trading is allowed.
We ¯nd that it does not matter much when the market-size di®erence is small. That is, our main results
hold even when we incorporate parallel traders into the model.
8 The detail of this discussion is upon request.
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4 Separate Downstream Duopolists
So far we have considered only one manufacturer. Now we extend the basic model to examine the cases
where retailers coexist in each market. There are still two retailers, but in case (i), the retailers are
independent of each other in both the domestic and foreign markets; and in case (ii), the retailers are
independent in one market but merged in the other market.
The ¯rst case enables us to check the robustness of Proposition 1, and we ¯nd that the additional
retailers and manufacturers do not a®ect the result that the volume of exports may fall as ¯rms'
production e±ciency is improved (Ghemawat et al., 2010).
With the second case, we investigate the e®ects of retail merger and how the merged large retailer
in°uences market performance. The problem caused by large retailers is an important topic in the
context of industrial organization (see for instance, Inderst and Sha®er, 2007).9 Some large retailers (e.g,
Tesco in the UK and Metro in Germany) can exert countervailing powers against upstream suppliers.
Such powers on the one hand reduce wholesale prices which may increase welfare, but on the other hand
they exert market power on ¯nal consumers which tends to lower welfare.
For our purpose, the simplest setup is as follows. In each market, a retailer procures from manufac-
turer A and the other from manufacturer B. Neither retailer procures from both manufacturers, nor do
both retailers procure from the same manufacturer. For details, please see Figure 5.
[Figure 5 here]
The assumptions concerning the manufacturers are similar to those in the previous section. With
two manufacturers j 2 fA;Bg, their cost functions are also di®erent as follows,
Cj(Qi;j ; Q¡i;j) = cj(Qi;j +Q¡i;j)2;
where Qi;j is the output of `retailer i; j'. We denote `retailer i; j' a retailer in market i 2 fD;Fg who
procures from manufacturer j 2 fA;Bg. Assuming the bargaining power of each retailer in market i to
9 Inderst and Sha®er (2007) analyze the impact of retail mergers on product variety. They show that, following a
merger, a retailer may want to enhance its buyer power by committing to a `single-sourcing' purchasing strategy.
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be given as ¯i 2 (0; 1) (i 2 fD;Fg), we can write the solution to the bargaining problem as:
wi;j = argmax
wi;j
¯i log[¼i;j ]+
(1¡ ¯i) log[(wi;jQi;j + w¡i;jQ¡i;j)¡ Cj(Qi;j ; Q¡i;j)¡ (w¡i;jQ¡i;j ¡ Cj(0; Q¡i;j))]; (14)
where ¼i;j is the pro¯t, wi;j is the wholesale price, and Qi;j is the output, all related to retailer i; j.
In market i 2 fD;Fg, the inverse demand is given as:
pi;j = ai ¡Qi;j ¡ °Qi;¡j ;
where ai is a positive constant, pi;j is the market price for product j, and ° 2 (0; 1) is the degree of
product di®erentiation between the two products.
4.1 Downstream duopoly
We ¯rst consider the case of the retailers being independent of each other in both the domestic and
foreign markets. Given the negotiated wholesale price wi;j , the maximization problem of retailer i; j
(i = D;F , j = A;B) is
max
Qi;j
¼i = (ai ¡Qi;j ¡ °Qi;¡j ¡ wi;j)Qi;j :
The ¯rst-order conditions lead to (second order conditions are satis¯ed)
Qi;j =
(2¡ °)ai ¡ 2wi;j + °wi;¡j
4¡ °2 ; ¼i;j = (Qi;j)
2: (15)
Substituting (15) into (14), we can rewrite the negotiated wholesale prices as
wi;j = argmax
wi;j
¯i log
·
((2¡ °)ai ¡ 2wi;j + °wi;¡j)2
(4¡ °2)2
¸
+(1¡ ¯i) log
·
wi;j((2¡ °)ai ¡ 2wi;j + °wi;¡j)
4¡ °2
¡c
µ
(2¡ °)ai ¡ 2wi;j + °wi;¡j
4¡ °2 +
(2¡ °)a¡i ¡ 2w¡i;j + °w¡i;¡j
4¡ °2
¶2
+c
µ
(2¡ °)a¡i ¡ 2w¡i;j + °w¡i;¡j
4¡ °2
¶2#
:(16)
These yield the following reaction functions (i 2 fD;Fg; j 2 fA;Bg):
wi;j =
1
4(4¡ °2 + 2cj) £ [(2¡ °)(ai(1¡ ¯i)(4¡ °
2) + 4(ai + (1 + ¯i)a¡i)cj)
¡ 4cj(1 + ¯i)(2w¡i;j ¡ °w¡i;¡j) + °((1¡ ¯i)(4¡ °2) + 4cj)wi;¡j ]:
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Notice that there are three other wholesale prices on the RHS: wi;¡j , w¡i;j and w¡i;¡j , which
represent respectively the wholesale prices for retailers i;¡j, ¡i; j, and ¡i;¡j. Retailer i; j directly
competes with retailer i;¡j in market i, indirectly competes with retailer ¡i; j through manufacturer
j, and is also indirectly related to retailer ¡i;¡j through manufacturer j. Let us now examine their
respective relationships with wi;j , which yields interesting comparisons.
Lemma 4 In the reaction function of wi;j, the coe±cients of wi;¡j, w¡i;j, and w¡i;¡j are respectively
positive, negative, and positive.
The coe±cient of wi;¡j is positive, so that the wholesale prices are complements across retailers in
market i (i = D;F ). That is, in each market, retailer i; j's wholesale price increases in retailer i;¡j's
wholesale price. These can be understood as follows. A higher wholesale price for retailer i;¡j increases
its cost, giving a competitive edge to its rival retailer i; j, enabling the latter to supply more in the retail
market. And anticipating retailer i; j's action, manufacturer j bargains for a higher wholesale price,
resulting in the positive coe±cient of wi;¡j . Note that this e®ect diminishes as the retailer's bargaining
power ¯i increases, because wholesale prices and pro¯ts will be depressed by a higher ¯i, which in turn
reduces the intensity of the strategic interaction between the upstream suppliers (this possibility is also
mentioned in Naylor (2002)).
In contrast, the coe±cient of w¡i;j is negative. As explained in the previous section with one
manufacturer, retailers i; j and ¡i; j indirectly compete with each other through manufacturer j. If
retailer ¡i; j procures more, the manufacturer must supply less to retailer i; j because the marginal
cost of the manufacturer rises by the increase in Q¡i;j , which forces up the wholesale price wi;j . Note
that this e®ect becomes stronger as the values of ¯i and c increase. A high retailer bargaining power ¯i
depresses the wholesale price, enabling the retailer to procure more. The increase in Qi;j through the
increase in ¯i enhances the marginal impact of the increase in Q¡i;j (the decrease in w¡i;j). A higher c
tightens the production `capacity' of the manufacturer. Therefore, the absolute value of the coe±cient
of w¡i;j increases as the values of ¯i and c increase.
Further, the coe±cient of w¡i;¡j is positive. The logic can be explained analogously as before. A
higher w¡i;¡j increases the quantity supplied by manufacturer j in market ¡i, which tends to reduce
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its supply to retailer i; j, again driving up the wholesale price wi;j .
Using the reaction functions wi;j = wi;j(wi;¡j ; w¡i;j ; w¡i;¡j), we also obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 5 At the equilibrium, the wholesale price w¤i;j, the quantity Qi;j, each retailer's pro¯t, and the
consumer surplus in each market are respectively
w¤i;j =ai +
(a¡i ¡ ai)[(4¡ °2)(4(1 + ¯i) + (1 + ¯¡i)(1¡ ¯i)°)¡ 8¯¡i(1 + ¯i)c¡j ¡ 4°¯i(1 + ¯¡i)cj ]
Ha
¡ (a¡i + ai)[(4¡ °
2)(4(1 + ¯i) + (1 + ¯¡i)(1¡ ¯i)°)
Hb
;
¡ 4(a¡i + ai)[2(2 + ¯¡i)(1 + ¯i)c¡j + °(2 + ¯i)(1 + ¯¡i)cj ]
Hb
;
Qi;j =
(2¡ °)ai ¡ 2w¤i;j + °w¤i;¡j
4¡ °2 ; ¼i;j = (Qi;j)
2; CSi = (1 + °)(Qi;j)2: (17)
where Ha ´ 16(2¡¯icj)(2¡¯¡ic¡j)¡ 4(5¡¯i¡¯¡i+¯i¯¡i¡¯i(1¡¯¡i)cj ¡¯¡i(1¡¯i)c¡j)°2+(1¡
¯i)(1 ¡ ¯¡i)°4 and Hb ´ 16(2 + (2 + ¯i)cj)(2 + (2 + ¯¡i)c¡j) ¡ 4(5 ¡ ¯i ¡ ¯¡i + ¯i¯¡i + (2 + ¯i)(1 ¡
¯¡i)cj + (2 + ¯¡i)(1¡ ¯i)c¡j)°2 + (1¡ ¯i)(1¡ ¯¡i)°4.
Using these results, we can check whether or not a non-monotonic relationship exists between Q and
cj . To simplify the analysis, we now assume that aD = 1, ¯D = ¯F = ¯, and cA = cB = c. Then
@QF;A
@c
=¡ 8(1 + ¯)[(1 + ¯ + aF )(2 + °)
2(4¡ ° + ¯°)2 ¡ 8aF¯(2 + ¯)(2 + °)(4¡ ° + ¯°)c]
((2 + °)(4¡ ° + ¯°)¡ 4¯c)2((2 + °)(4¡ ° + ¯°) + 4(2 + ¯)c)2
¡ 8(1 + ¯)[16¯(2 + ¯)(1 + ¯ ¡ aF )c
2]
((2 + °)(4¡ ° + ¯°)¡ 4¯c)2((2 + °)(4¡ ° + ¯°) + 4(2 + ¯)c)2 :
Since Qi;j > 0 for any i; j, the upper bound of c is given by
QD;j > 0 , c < (2 + °)(4¡ ° + ¯°)4((1 + ¯)aF ¡ 1) ´ ¹cd:
First note that @QF;A=@c is negative when c = 0. Next, we check whether there exists some range of c
such that @QF;A=@c > 0. Substituting c = ¹cd into @QF;A=@c to give
@QF;A
@c
¯¯¯¯
c=¹cd
=
8(1 + ¯ ¡ aF )(aF ¡ 1 + ¯aF )
(a2F ¡ 1)(1 + ¯)(2 + °)2(4¡ ° + ¯°)
:
From the calculation we have the following result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that aD = 1, ¯D = ¯F = ¯, and cA = cB = c. Then QF;j is increasing in c if
cF < c < ¹cd and 1 < aF < 1 + ¯.
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Proposition 2 shows that the result in Proposition 1 is robust even when the number of manufacturers
and retailers increase; that is, output (exports) can still fall when a ¯rm's e±ciency increases.
Note that for algebraic simplicity, we have assumed cA = cB = c. It is easy to ¯nd an example that
an increase in heterogeneous ci (i = A;B) can increase the quantities supplied in market F . Also, if
aD = aF = 1, calculations give the following properties of wi;j and Qi;j :
@wi;j
@c
> 0;
@wi;j
@¯i
< 0;
@wi;j
@¯¡i
> 0;
@Qi;j
@c
< 0;
@Qi;j
@¯i
> 0;
@Qi;j
@¯¡i
< 0:
4.2 Downstream merger
We are particularly interested in the case when the retailers in one market (say F ) merge. Such a
case is related to several prior researches (Naylor (2002), Lommerud et al. (2005), Matsushima (2006),
Symeonidis (2010)), who explicitly or implicitly show that a merger between downstream duopolists
does not always improve their pro¯ts when upstream suppliers have relatively strong bargaining power
over downstream retailers, because the downstream merger eliminates the competition between the
upstream suppliers, making them stronger to counter and o®set the downstream merger.
In this subsection, we show that a downstream merger which leads to a monopoly does not improve
the total pro¯t of the merged entities if the bargaining power of the merged ¯rm is strong, which is quite
di®erent from those in the literature.
For simplicity, we now assume aD = aF = 1, i.e., the market size is the same for the two markets D
and F . Then the objective function of the merged ¯rm is
¼F;M ´ (1¡QF;A ¡ °QF;B ¡ wF;A)QF;A + (1¡QF;B ¡ °QF;A ¡ wF;B)QF;B : (18)
Pro¯t maximization gives the ¯rst-order conditions as (Second order conditions are satis¯ed)
QF;j =
(1¡ °)¡ 2wF;j + °wF;¡j
2(1¡ °2) ; ¼F;j =
(1¡ wF;j)QF;j
2
: (19)
Similarly as before, we can obtain the ¯rst-order conditions for the negotiation between retailer i; j
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and manufacturer i as
wD;j =
1
4(1¡ °2)(4¡ °2 + 2c) £ [(2¡ °)(1¡ °)((1¡ ¯D)(4¡ °
2)(1 + °) + 2(4 + 2¯D + 3° + ¯F °)c)
¡ 2c(1 + ¯D)(4¡ °2)(wF;j ¡ °wF;¡j) + (1¡ °2)°((1¡ ¯D)(4¡ °2) + 4c)wD;¡j ];
wF;j =
1
(4¡ °2)(2(1¡ °2) + c) £ [(2¡ °)(1¡ °)((1¡ ¯F )(1¡ °
2)(2 + °) + (4 + 2¯F + 3° + 2¯D°)c)
¡ 2c(1 + ¯F )(1¡ °2)(2wD;j ¡ °wD;¡j) + (4¡ °2)°((1¡ ¯F )(1¡ °2) + c)wF;¡j ]:
The basic properties of the reaction functions are similar to that in the non-merged case. That is,
Lemma 6 Suppose that aD = aF = 1 and cD = cF = c. When the downstream retailers in market
F horizontally merge, in the reaction functions of wD;j and wF;j, the coe±cients of wi;¡j, w¡i;j, and
w¡i;¡j are respectively positive, negative, and positive.
Using the reaction functions wi;j = wi;j(wi;¡j ; w¡i;j ; w¡i;¡j), we further obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 7 Suppose that aD = aF = 1 and cD = cF = c. When the downstream retailers in market F
horizontally merge, the equilibrium wholesale price wi;j, the equilibrium quantity Qi;j, the pro¯t of each
retailer, and the consumer surplus in each market are respectively
wD;j =
(1¡ ¯D)(4¡ °2)(1 + °)(2¡ (1¡ ¯F )°)
HM
+
c(4(4 + ¯F (1 + ¯D)) + 2(3 + ¯D)(1 + ¯F )° ¡ (5¡ ¯D ¡ 4¯F )°2)¡ 4c2(¯D + ¯F + ¯D¯F )
HM
;
wF;j =
(1¡ ¯F )(1¡ °2)(2 + °)(4¡ (1¡ ¯D)°)
HM
+
c(4(4 + ¯D(1 + ¯F )) + 2(3 + 2¯F )(1 + ¯D)° ¡ (5¡ ¯D ¡ 4¯F )°2)¡ 4c2(¯D + ¯F + ¯D¯F )
HM
;
QD;j =
2(1 + ¯D)((1 + °)(2¡ ° + ¯F °)¡ ¯F c)
HM
; ¼D;j = (QD;j)2; CSD = (1 + °)(QD;j)2; (20)
QF;j =
(1 + ¯F )((2 + °)(4¡ ° + ¯D°)¡ 4¯Dc)
2HM
; ¼F;M = 2(1 + °)(QF;j)2; CSF = (1 + °)(QF;j)2:
(21)
where HM ´ (1+°)(2+°)(2¡ (1¡¯F )°)(4¡ (1¡¯D)°)+c(16+2(3+¯D+2¯F )¡ (5¡¯D¡4¯F )°2)¡
4c2(¯D + ¯F + ¯D¯F ):
Also, calculations give the following properties of wi;j and Qi;j :
@wi;j
@¯i
< 0;
@wi;j
@¯¡i
> 0;
@Qi;j
@¯i
> 0;
@Qi;j
@¯¡i
< 0; for all exogenous parameters:
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We now discuss the relation between c and wi;j (Qi;j). To simplify the exposition, we again assume
¯D = ¯F = ¯. For a large c, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 8 Suppoase that ¯D = ¯F = ¯. The wholesale price wi;j can be increasing in c.
Note that the details for this lemma can be shown as,
when ¯ ¸ 3° ¡ 2
3° + 2
;
@wF;j
@c
> 0 for all exogenous parameters and
@wD;j
@c
< 0
if and only if c >
2(2 + ¯)(1 + °)(2¡ ° + ¯°)
2¯(2 + ¯)
¡
p
°(1 + °)(1 + ¯)(2 + ¯)(2¡ ° + ¯°)(2 + 2¯ ¡ 3° + 3¯°)
2¯(2 + ¯)
;
when ¯ · 3° ¡ 2
3° + 2
;
@wD;j
@c
> 0 for all exogenous parameters and
@wF;j
@c
< 0
if and only if c >
(2 + ¯)(2 + °)(4¡ ° + ¯°)
4¯(2 + ¯)
¡
p¡°(2 + °)(1 + ¯)(2 + ¯)(4¡ ° + ¯°)(2 + 2¯ ¡ 3° + 3¯°)
4¯(2 + ¯)
:
(22)
Therefore, if the bargaining power is strong and the cost parameter c is large enough, an increase in
c can increase the quantities supplied by the retailers in market D, which again con¯rms the robustness
of Proposition 1.
4.3 The e®ect of downstream merger
The merger is unpro¯table if ¼F;M < 2¼i;j , where ¼i;j and ¼F;M are given in (17) and (21). To simplify
the exposition, we assume that ¯D = ¯F = ¯. Although calculation becomes more complicated, we can
depict the di®erence between ¼F;M and 2¼i;j , ¢¼F;j ´ ¼F;M ¡ 2¼i;j (see Figure 6). The ¯gure leads to
the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose that ¯D = ¯F = ¯. An increase in either ¯ or c decreases ¢¼F;j.
If the wholesale prices did not change, the merger would increase the pro¯ts of the merged retailer
since downstream competition is removed. However, a counter-intuitive result arises here: the merger
can increase the wholesale prices if the value of c is large and the bargaining power of the retailer is
high (see Lemma 8). The logic is as follows. The merger allows the merged retailers to change retail
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quantities °exibly, that is re°ected in Qi;j in (15) and QF;j in (19), the latter of which is more sensitive
to wF;j than the former. This in turn a®ects the reaction function of wD;j (the wholesale price for the
non-merged retailers). With the merger in market i, the reaction function of wDj becomes more elastic
with respect to wF;j .10 This arises since an increase in wF;j decreases QF;j signi¯cantly, which relaxes
the production `capacity' of manufacturer j. Moreover, Qi;j monotonically increases in ¯i. Therefore,
if the bargaining power of retailers in market i is strong, the merger in market i allows retailers in
market ¡i to procure more inputs from the manufacturers. It in turn increases the marginal costs of
the manufacturers, resulting in worse procurement conditions for the merged retailer and lowering its
pro¯ts.
[Figure 6 here]
The merger also a®ects the threat points of the manufacturers. The decrease in the quantities
supplied to the merged ¯rm lowers the pro¯ts of the manufacturers, which also raises the non-merged
retailer's bargaining position when negotiating with the manufacturer, lowering wD;j . This then in-
creases wF;j , since the wholesale prices are strategic substitutes as shown earlier.
Finally, we brie°y discuss the welfare implication of a downstream merger, using Figure 6. When the
bargaining power of the retailers is weak (small ¯), the downstream merger improves welfare, because
the merger generates an outside value for the merged ¯rm, which improves its procurement conditions.
However, when ¯ is large, this positive e®ect is weak because the pre-merged downstream ¯rms have
already exerted their strong bargaining power. As in standard oligopoly theory, the elimination of the
downstream competition between the merged entities worsens welfare.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the relationship between a ¯rm's productivity improvement and its volume of
exports. Speci¯cally, we simultaneously take into account intermediate traders (i.e., vertically) and
10 The di®erence between the coe±cients of wF;j in the post-merger and the pre-merger is
¡ 2c(1 + ¯D)(4¡ °
2)
4(1¡ °2)(4¡ °2 + 2c) ¡

¡ 2c(1 + ¯D)
4¡ °2 + 2c

= ¡ 3c(1 + ¯D)°
2
2(1¡ °2)(4¡ °2 + 2c) < 0:
That is, the coe±cients of wF;j in the post-merger is steeper that that in the pre-merger.
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multimarket linkages (i.e., horizontally) which have not been considered in the existing literature. We
found that the manufacturer will adjust exports when facing productivity changes, by making corre-
sponding changes in other related markets, to take advantage of its improved outside options. Our
result might be a simple explanation to the interesting \productivity puzzle" posed by Ghemawat et al.
(2010): there is \an apparent lack of any relationship" between productivity growth rates in Catalan
manufacturing and changes in international trade position. It also highlights the importance of taking
into account the vertical relationship between the manufacturer and retailers, as well as their strategic
interactions through which pro¯t shifting is carried out across multimarkets horizontally.
We also extended the model to examine the relationship between buyer power, pro¯tability and
social surplus. We ¯nd that the horizontal merger is unpro¯table if the bargaining power of the merged
¯rm is strong, but such a merger may improve welfare. Our result is quite di®erent from those in the
literature (Lommerud et al. (2005) and Symeonidis (2010)) which show that the horizontal merger is
unpro¯table if the bargaining power of the upstream supplier is strong.
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Appendix
Here we show that Lemma 1 holds under general cost and demand conditions. We add the following
notation: ¼D(wD) is the pro¯t of the domestic retailer with ¼0D(wD) < 0, QD(wD) is the demand in the
domestic market (Q0D(wD) < 0), QF (wF ) is the demand in the foreign market (Q
0
F (wF ) < 0), and c(¢)
is the cost function of the manufacturer (c0 > 0, c00 > 0).
The bargaining problem between M and D is
Max ¯ log[¼D(wD)]
+ (1¡ ¯) log[wDQD(wD) + wFQF (wF )
¡ c(QD(wD) +QF (wF ))¡ fwFQF (wF )¡ c(QF (wF ))g]
) ¯ log[¼D(wD)] + (1¡ ¯) log[wDQD(wD)¡ c(QD(wD) +QF (wF )) + c(QF (wF ))];
which leads to the ¯rst-order condition
¯
¼0D(wD)
¼D(wD)
+ (1¡ ¯)wDQ
0
D(wD) +QD(wD)¡ c0(QD(wD) +QF (wF ))Q0D(wD)
wDQD(wD)¡ c(QD(wD) +QF (wF )) + c(QF (wF )) = 0:
The numerator of the second fraction, wDQ0D(wD) +QD(wD)¡ c0(QD(wD) +QF (wF ))Q0D(wD), must
be positive because the denominators of the fractions are positive and ¼0D(wD) < 0.
The total di®erential of the ¯rst-order condition is
(S:O:C:)dwD + (1¡ ¯)
·¡c00(QD +QF )Q0FQ0D[wDQD ¡ c(QD +QF ) + c(QF )]
[wDQD ¡ c(QD +QF ) + c(QF )]2
+
(c0(QD +QF )¡ c0(QF ))Q0F [wDQ0D +QD ¡ c0(QD +QF )Q0D]
[wDQD ¡ c(QD +QF ) + c(QF )]2
¸
dwF = 0:
Both the ¯rst and second fractions are negative (c00(QD +QF ) > 0, Q0D < 0, Q
0
F < 0, wDQD ¡ c(QD +
QF ) + c(QF ) > 0), and (c0(QD + QF ) ¡ c0(QF ) > 0, Q0F < 0, wDQ0D + QD ¡ c0(QD + QF )Q0D > 0).
Thus the coe±cient of dwF is negative. Since the second order condition is also negative, we have
dwD=dwF < 0; which means that the prices charged to retailers are strategic substitutes under general
conditions.
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